Lewin, M. and Lewin, P. 2023. Shan, Yafeng, ed. 2022, New Directions in Metaphilosophy. Metaphilosophy, 53 (2-3). pp. 153-361. Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico 16/1, 195-198. 

https://doi.org/10.36253/Aisthesis-1004.

Shan, Yafeng, ed. (2022) New Directions in Metaphilosophy. Metaphilosophy, 53 (2-3). pp. 153-361. ISSN 0026-1068.

 

1

 

The special issue “New Directions in Metaphilosophy” in the journal Metaphilosophy (Wiley-Blackwell) is a collection of 12 articles, which have been previously presented at the same-titled online conference at the University of Kent in May 2021. Its aim is to address current metaphilosophical debates and suggest new methods. As Yafeng Shan states in the editor’s introduction, the issue is only “the tip of the iceberg” (157). The issue consists of three sections – 1. Defending philosophy, 2. How to do philosophy, and 3. Doing philosophy.

The first part defends metaphysics, the value of philosophy, and theoretical philosophy against current approaches and objections. Timothy Williamson, in “Metametaphysics and semantics”, argues that a contemporary intensional semantics that assigns a truth value to a proposition in the framework of possible worlds shifts the focus from questions about the necessary nature and structure of reality to linguistic practices, which trivializes metaphysics. He suggests a theory “sentential guises” to solve this problem: diversity on the side of forms of expression leads to new cognitive relations to old truths.

In “Philosophy doesn’t need a concept of progress”, Yafeng Shan suggests replacing the category of progress in philosophy by the category of philosophical success. Philosophy should focus on achievements (success), not on better achievements (progress). Shan argues that success is a non-comparative category and not suitable to understand philosophy. Philosophers value dissent, older ideas, and individual results more than scientists do.

Chris Daly’s “T-Philosophy” is a systematic response to Paul Horwich’s criticisms of traditional and theoretical philosophy based on the later Wittgenstein. Daly offers a variety of counterarguments to the claims that theoretical philosophy is defective and makes little progress by disambiguating concepts, joining science in its ideal of simplicity, finding constraints to choose between competing theories, and taking philosophical theories to be true.

The second part of the special issue explores and discusses different methods and approaches to various (meta-)philosophical problems – naturalized metaphysics, ordinary language, digital philosophy of science, conceptual engineering, logic and practice, and poetry.

Jack Ritchie, in “On the continuity of metaphysics with science” shows that the methods of metaphysics cannot be fully equal to those of the empirical sciences, so there can be no metaphysical project that can be stated to be truly continuous with science. Metaphysicians should abandon the claim to describe the fundamental structure of reality and redefine the goals of metaphysics as a way of examining scientific theories or as a field of metaphors.

“In defense of ordinary language philosophy” is an attempt by Herman Cappelen and Matthew McKeever to rehabilitate the importance of ordinary language philosophy. Authors argue that ordinary language guides large parts of philosophy. Not only do ordinary language expressions serve as “anchors” for further investigations, philosophers also – unlike physicists or biologists – usually care about their use by the communication community.

In “Testing and discovery: Responding to challenges to digital philosophy of science” Charles H. Pence claims that digital methods can be a source of interesting features of the scientific process since they can bring new ways of testing hypotheses. The problems these tools can bring can be partially removed via preregistration of hypotheses, methods, and the empirical results.

Eve Kitsik in “Attentional progress by conceptual engineering” states that conceptual engineering can be helpful to configure philosophers’ collective patterns of attention by analyzing the concepts that philosophers use, and then to shape patterns of attention to better represent the environment. And some varieties of conceptual engineering can also help to select the attention-worthy objects for philosophical analysis and action.

Ben Martin suggests introducing a new area of research: “The philosophy of logical practice”. He argues that traditional accounts of logic are too idealized. Logic can be examined bottom-up as a research field. Analysis of case studies and the practice of experts provide further reaching questions and insights.

Jon Williamson, in “One philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens”, analyses a possible threat for philosophy as a rational enterprise. Many philosophical arguments seem to be what he calls “pantomemes”, easy to resist by simply denying the conclusion of a modus ponens. He suggests appealing to normal informal standards of what is reasonable. 

Karen Simecek in “Linking perspectives: A role for poetry in philosophical inquiry” argues that reading lyric poetry can play a substantive role in philosophy by helping the philosopher understand the perspectives, attitudes of minds, beliefs and thought processes of others. Arguments against the use of non-necessarily philosophical forms of thinking in philosophy relate to a narrow conception of philosophy that is criticized as limited and opposed to the author’s notion of philosophy as a collective endeavor.

The third part contains two articles that address two topics that arise during the practice of philosophizing. 

Amanda Bryant, in “Grounding interventionism” analyzes the prospects for an adequately formulated and well-founded analog of causal interventionism by reviewing several formulations of it and its epistemic credentials. The requirements of causal interventionism and grounding interventionism are criticized as inadequate, appealing to intuition, and poorly effective. 

Zack Garrett and Zachariah Wrublewski, in “Impossible worlds and the safety of philosophical beliefs”, examine modal conditions for knowledge. The safety condition “If S were to believe p via M, then p would be true” in context of possible worlds analysis faces several problems that can be solved by introduction of the category “impossible worlds”.

 

2

 

Does the issue what it says on the tin? The authors rather react to some of the ongoing discussions and challenges than invent and suggest new directions in metaphilosophy. Given the constant and growing interest in metaphilosophy and the fact that metaphilosophy is a young research field, the title of the issue could fit many other issues in the journal Metaphilosophy (5 issues per year since 1970), let alone all other recent publications. One should also consider the variety of research traditions, schools, and approaches – for instance, phenomenology, pragmatism, perspectivism, and historically inspired analyses – that actively contribute to contemporary metaphilosophical research. Besides, the practical, ethical dimensions of philosophical practice belong to the underwater part of Shan’s iceberg. The number of citations of Timothy Williamson’s works, the chosen topics and debates, and the possible worlds analyses show that the special issue partially stands in the wake of a larger re-assessment of methods of analytic philosophy. This, however, does neither reduce the theoretical importance nor question the novelty of suggested theses and arguments in context of global metaphilosophical debates. Highlighted can be Martin’s reasoning for the expert-oriented bottom-up reconstruction of logic, which can potentially widen our picture of this research field. Cappelen and McKeever convincingly show that ordinary language is and must be a part of philosophical practice. Elimination of unworthy concepts to redirect attention to important discussions, as addressed by Kitsik, is worth being considered. Shan’s thesis that philosophers do not need the concept of progress will provoke its defenders (including us) to give several good counterarguments. It would be not a complete waste of time to compare Timothy Williamson’s de-trivialization attempt with a Kantian perspective on possible worlds. We find that these and other papers on the issue contain multiple promising ideas and solutions and are worth being read by anyone interested in contemporary metaphilosophical debates.

 

3

 

YAFENG SHAN: The unexamined philosophy is not worth doing: An introduction to New Directions in Metaphilosophy, 153-158

 

Part 1. Defending philosophy

 

TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON: Metametaphysics and semantics, 162-175

YAFENG SHAN: Philosophy doesn’t need a concept of progress, 176-184

CHRIS DALY: T-Philosophy, 185-198

 

Part 2. How to do philosophy

 

JACK RITCHIE On the continuity of metaphysics with science: Some scepticism and some suggestions, 202-220

HERMAN CAPPELEN AND MATTHEW MCKEEVER In defense of ordinary language philosophy, 221-237

CHARLES H. PENCE Testing and discovery: Responding to challenges to

digital philosophy of science, 238-253

EVE KITSIK Attentional progress by conceptual engineering, 254-266

BEN MARTIN The philosophy of logical practice, 267-283

JON WILLIAMSON One philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens: Pantomemes and nisowir, 284-304

KAREN SIMECEK Linking perspectives: A role for poetry in philosophical inquiry, 305-318

 

Part 3. Doing philosophy

 

AMANDA BRYANT Grounding interventionism: Conceptual and epistemological challenges, 322-343

ZACK GARRETT AND ZACHARIAH WRUBLEWSKI Impossible worlds and the safety of philosophical beliefs, 344-361

 

The editor of the issue, Yafeng Shan, is a research associate in philosophy at the University of Kent. He received his Ph.D. from University College London, and his main research interests are philosophy of science, epistemology, and metaphysics.

 

Michael Lewin and Polina Lewin,
Academia Kantiana,
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University.