Lewin, M. 2023. Kant on Philosophy as Conceptual Analysis, Con-Textos Kantianos 18, 11-20. https://dx.doi.org/10.5209/kant.91509. [1] Abstract: For Kant, philosophical investigations are inherently analytic. The proper method of philosophy is analysis, and the object of analysis are concepts. Hence, Kant’s short description of philosophy as “rational cognition […] from concepts” (KrV, A 837/B 865) can be substituted […]
Tag: Definition
Introduction to “Kant and Metaphilosophy”
Lewin, M. 2023. Introduction to “Kant and Metaphilosophy”, Kantian Journal 42/3, 7-16. https://doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2023-3-1. Abstract: There is a growing interest in both Kant’s conception of philosophy and contemporary metaphilosophy, understood as philosophical inquiry into philosophy, its aims, purpose, subjects, structure, practice and methods. Kant has not contributed to metaphilosophy qua contemporary discipline, but his direct analyses of what […]
Kant’s Metaphilosophy
Lewin, M. 2021. Kant’s Metaphilosophy, Open Philosophy 4/1: 292-310. https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0190. Abstract: While the term “metaphilosophy” enjoys increasing popularity in Kant scholarship, it is neither clear what distinguishes a metaphilosophical theory from a philosophical one nor to what extent Kant’s philosophy contains metaphilosophical views. In the first part of the paper, I will introduce a demarcation criterion and […]